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Abstract
Nash equilibrium is a solution concept in non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative
game theory that finds applications in various scientific and engineering disciplines. A
non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative game model is presented here for two qubit
quantum computations that allows for the characterization of Nash equilibrium in these
computations via the inner product of their state space. Nash equilibrium outcomes
are optimal under given constraints and therefore offer a game-theoretic measure of
constrained optimization of two qubit quantum computations.
1 Introduction
The theory of quantum games was originally envisioned by Meyer [1] to be a study of as-
pects of quantum mechanics such as quantum algorithms via non-cooperative game theory.
However, intervening years appear to have blurred the line between the object of study and
the tool being used to study it, and a majority of the work in the subject tends to instead
study non-cooperative games under a quantum mechanical model. In fact, this pole-reversal
if you will, took place early in the development of quantum game theory, starting with the
Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein paper [2] and eventually producing a plethora of litera-
ture containing results that were really game-theoretic in nature but to which an improper
quantum physical significance has been sometimes attached.
Motivated by discussions with colleagues (acknowledged in section 7 below), Simon
J.D. Phoenix and I have recently clarified some of these categorical issues in quantum game
theory in [3]. We have argued in [3] that if the idea behind the merger of quantum physics
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and game theory is to gain new insights into aspects of quantum physics, then the correct ap-
proach to quantum game theory should be “gaming the quantum” as envisioned by Meyer
and not “ quantizing games” as proposed by Eisert et al. Let me motivate this argument
further here as follows: quantum physicist are familiar and comfortable with quantiza-
tion of phenomenon, both abstract and those carrying physical significance. For instance,
information is quantized by associating the state space of a quantum system (a complex
projective Hilbert space) with the set of probability distributions (a convex set). Likewise,
space-time is quantized by associating the state space of a quantum system with a region of
space-time (a differentiable manifold). Note that when a phenomenon is quantized, it is the
object of study under a quantum physical model. Therefore, quantum information (more
accurately, quantized information) is the study of information processing under a quantum
physical model, and quantum field theory is the study of space-time under a quantum phys-
ical model. It follows that quantized games study games under a quantum physical model,
but not necessarily aspects of quantum physics under a game-theoretic model. Therefore,
attaching quantum physical significance to any results in quantized game theory may not
always be the most obvious or the most sensible thing to do.
The idea of studying one type of object by analogy with one of another type is an old
one; however, it was mathematically formalized in the early part of the twentieth century
under the name of category theory where one studies objects in one (mathematical) category
via those in another. A fundamentally important feature of this mathematically formal
process of forming analogies is a functor, that is, a map that associates objects in one
category to those in another and satisfies certain axioms. John Baez poetically expresses
the importance of functors in science in [4] as follows: “...every sufficiently good analogy
is yearning to become a functor”.
What is most relevant to note here about functors is that as with functions, it is important
to differentiate between their domain and co-domain. Hence, quantization schemes always
map from the category of Hilbert space into some other, allowing one to study the objects
in the co-domain category via objects in the domain category. It is indeed conceivable that
such distinction may sometimes be moot; however, I would argue that if good scientific
reasoning has taught us anything it is that one should let such simplification arise naturally
from a minimal set of assumptions.
To make this point further, note that if one insists that a gamed quantum system should
collapse to the underlying game upon the introduction of appropriate restrictions [5], then
one has effectively quantized a game! However, in the absence of such restrictions, one is
only gaming the quantum system with the goal of gaining new insights into the quantum
2
system. So quantizing a game is a special case of gaming the quantum, but not necessarily
the other way around.
Category theory has recently become popular among quantum information scientists,
as evidenced by works of Abramsky et. al, [6], Baez [4], and Bergholm et al. [7] that
studies quantum informational aspects from a categorical perspective. A similar categorical
approach in quantum game theory can only clarify the subject further and offer deeper
insights into notions of constrained optimization and equilibrium in quantum systems, for
example.
In this paper, I will build up on my previous work with Simon J.D. Phoenix in [3]
where we presented a strictly competitive game model for two qubit quantum computations
and characterized the corresponding solution concept of mini-max outcomes via the inner
product of the Hilbert space of these computations. Strictly competitive games are a special
case of the more general class of games known as non-cooperative games. They are so
special a case in fact that they are sometimes criticized as being of little practical use in
modeling real world phenomena. But history bears witness to the practical usefulness of
non-cooperative game theory in areas ranging from Economics to various disciplines of
engineering. It can be easily argued that this success of game theory as a practically useful
science is due to the work of John Nash in formulating the now ubiquitous solution concept
of Nash equilibrium for non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative games. For the sake of
further clarity, I point out here that mini-max outcomes are identical to Nash equilibrium
in strictly competitive games, but Nash equilibrium need not be a mini-max outcome in
general.
Motivated by the significance of Nash equilibrium in game theory and its more tradi-
tional applications, I will offer in this paper a non-strictly competitive game model for two
qubit quantum computations and establish a notion of Nash equilibrium in such “quantum
games” using the inner product of the Hilbert space of these computations. It is hoped that
this application of the more general non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative game theory
to quantum mechanics will produce further new insights in the constrained optimization of
quantum mechanisms.
In the following section 2, I restate the established notion of functional form of non-
cooperative games and the terminology that facilitates the definition of the solution concept
of Nash equilibrium. In the same spirit, the notion of dominant strategies is developed
in section 3, followed by notions of quantum games with dominant strategies in section 4
and Nash equilibrium in section 5.1 Application to two qubit quantum computations and
algorithms is discussed in section 5, followed by conclusions and potential future work in
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section 6.
2 Non-cooperative games in normal form
A non-cooperative game in normal form is a function
Γ :
∏
Xi −→ Y (1)
with Xi the strategy set of player i and Y the set of outcomes with a notion of non-identical
preferences of the players defined over these outcomes. In a game with finitely many
players, a play of the game is a tuple of strategies, one per player, (x1, x2, . . . , xn), with
xi ∈ Xi. A play of the game is said to be Nash equilibrium if unilateral deviation by any
player from his choice of strategy will produce an outcome of the game that is less prefer-
able to that player. In other words, a Nash equilibrium play is one in which each player
employs a strategy that is a best reply to those of his opponents. Hence, a Nash equilib-
rium outcome is an optimal outcome under given constraints, where the constraints are the
non-identical preferences of the players over the outcomes.
For a more concrete example of a game, consider the following famous game called
Prisoner’s Dilemma, a two player game with both players having access to two strategies
labeled C and D. The outcomes of the game are {o1, o2, o3, o4} with non-identical prefer-
ences of the players over the elements of this set defined as
I : o3 ≻ o1 ≻ o4 ≻ o2 (2)
II : o2 ≻ o1 ≻ o4 ≻ o3. (3)
where ≻ represents the notion of “preferred over”. The game itself can be defined as
P : X1 ×X2 −→ {o1, o2, o3, o4} (4)
with
X1 = X2 = {C,D} , Y = {o1, o2, o3, o4} (5)
and
P (C,C) = o1, P (C,D) = o2, P (D,C) = o3, P (D,D) = o4 (6)
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3 Two player games with dominant strategies
Games like Prisoner’s Dilemma have added structure to the players’ preferences. In Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, for player I it is the case that
o3 or o4 ≻ o1 or o2 (7)
and for player II it is the case that
o2 or o4 ≻ o1 or o3 (8)
In this situation, the notion of strongly dominant strategy arises as a strategy that a given
player will utilize regardless of what his opponent does. In Prisoner’s Dilemma, based on
(6), player I and II will both always utilize the strategy D regardless of what their opponent
does. Hence, appropriate conditions on players’ preferences in this case induce players’
preferences over their strategic choices, a fact that can be used to compute Nash equilibrium
by arguing that a player would never employ a dominated strategy. In Prisoners’ Dilemma,
this means that the play (D,D) is a Nash equilibrium and the corresponding outcome o4
the Nash equilibrium outcome.
A question of both mathematical and game-theoretic interest could be raised here about
the classification of all those two player, two strategy normal form games that entertain
dominant strategies (note that the way the function Γ maps into Y will influence the ex-
istence of dominant strategies) and therefore a Nash equilibrium. Instead of attempting to
answer this general question here however, I will consider next the restricted case where the
normal form games are quantum physically meaningful.
4 Two player quantum games with dominant strategies
A quantum game in normal form is a function Q with Xi = (Hd)i, a d-dimensional Hilbert
space representing the strategy set of player i, and Y = He, a e-dimensional Hilbert space
representing the set of outcomes with a notion of non-identical preferences of each player
defined over its elements. In a game with finitely many players, a play of the game is a tuple
of strategies, one per player, (x1, x2, . . . , xn), with xi ∈ (Hd)i. In functional symbols,
Q :
∏
(Hd)i −→ He (9)
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While it is straight forward to map the functional language of games in normal form
to quantum mechanical systems as above, it is not as straight forward to talk of players’
preferences over the outcomes, for in any such quantum game we must justify notions
of players’ preferences within a physical context. This can be achieved by appealing to
the concept of observables, that is, elements of an orthogonal basis of He. For example,
consider a two qubit quantum computation Q in the game-theoretic context of Prisoner’s
Dilemma by setting
(Hd)1 = (Hd)2 = H2, He = H4. (10)
The Hilbert space H4 has associated with it four observables in the form of elements of
an orthogonal basis, say B = {b1, b2, b3, b4}, exactly one of which is the ultimate results
of any two qubit quantum computation set up with respect to B and followed by measure-
ment. Given the physical significance of the elements of B, one can first define players’
preferences over the elements of B as per Prisoner’s Dilemma to get
Player I : b3 ≻ b1 ≻ b4 ≻ b2 (11)
Player II : b2 ≻ b1 ≻ b4 ≻ b3. (12)
and further insist that for player I
b3 or b4 ≻ b1 or b2 (13)
and that for player II
b2 or b4 ≻ b1 or b3. (14)
The inner-product of the H4 allows a more general notion of players’ preferences to be set
up [3] via (13) and (14) as follows. Player I will prefer an arbitrary outcome, that is, a
quantum superposition p of the elements of B in H4 over another q if p is closer to b3 or b4
than q is, and player II will prefer any arbitrary quantum superposition r over another s if r
is closer to b2 or b4 than s is. Denote by θ(,) the geometric distance between two quantum
superpositions induced by the inner-product of Hilbert space; then
Player I : p ≻ q whenever θ(p,b3) < θ(q,b3) or θ(p,b4) < θ(q,b4) (15)
Player II : r ≻ s whenever θ(r,b2) < θ(s,b2) or θ(r,b4) < θ(s,b4) (16)
Any two qubit quantum computation Q for which the elements of Im(Q) ⊆ H4, where
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Im(Q) is the image of Q, satisfy (15) and (16) can now be referred to as quantum Prisoner’s
Dilemma, and one can ask for states of qubits in H2, one per player (players’ quantum
strategies), that are dominant and correspond to Nash equilibrium. Since quantum Pris-
oner’s Dilemma has infinitely many outcomes corresponding to infinitely many possible
strategic choices of the players, it is not possible to identify potential dominant strategies
by a direct analysis of the added structure of players preferences over the outcomes similar
to the one that can be performed in Prisoners Dilemma. Instead, the effect of the added
structure of players preferences over arbitrary outcomes of quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma is
first captured by (15) and (16) and these conditions are then used to identify Nash equilib-
rium; finally, one concludes by virtue of (15) and (16) that all quantum strategies realizing
Nash equilibrium are necessarily strongly dominant, as the following discussion shows.
4.1 Nash equilibrium and dominant strategies
Nash equilibrium in Q can be identified as follows. Suppose N ∈ Im(Q) is a Nash equi-
librium arising from the play (A∗, B∗), that is Q(A∗, B∗) = N . If player I unilaterally
deviates from strategy A∗ to another A, then the result q = Q(A,B∗) will be less prefer-
able to him than N . Similarly, if player II unilaterally deviates from strategy B∗ to another
B, then the result s = Q(A∗, B) will be less preferable to him than N . It follows that
for player I, N ≻ q for any q ∈ Im(Q), and that for player 2, N ≻ s for any s ∈ Im(Q).
Therefore, N is a quantum state that satisfies both (15) and (16) with N = p = r. It follows
immediately that all Nash equilibrium quantum strategies are necessarily strongly dominant
and the players will never employ any other strategy in quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma.
5 Application to quantum computation
An immediate significance of gaming two qubit quantum computation lies in the ability to
talk meaningfully of constrained optimization of these computations. In [8], Simon J.D.
Phoenix and I have optimized two qubit quantum computations under constraints arising
from a strictly competitive (also known as zero-sum) game model. Strictly competitive
games have the property that one player’s win is exactly the other player’s loss. As such,
strictly competitive constraints offer an interesting potential approach to studying Grover’s
algorithm which searches for an item from a finite collection. One can view the item being
searched for as the winning outcome for one player, and all other outcomes as the winning
outcome for the other. A Nash equilibrium in such a quantum game would occur at the
so-called mini-max outcome.
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Gaming two qubit quantum computations using the game model of Prisoner’s Dilemma
here gives the first instance of a proper application of non-strictly competitive game the-
ory to a quantum system, resulting in the characterization of qubit states that produce an
optimal outcome under such constraints. Classification of two qubit states and quantum
computations that are optimal under the constraints of Prisoner’s Dilemma can be achieved
by a detailed mechanism design approach similar to the one in [8]. The initial set up for
such an analysis follows below, with the detailed analysis itself left as an excercise for the
reader.
Start with
B = {b1 = |0〉 ⊗ |0〉 , b2 = |0〉 ⊗ |1〉 , b3 = |1〉 ⊗ |0〉 , b4 = |1〉 ⊗ |1〉} ,
as the standard (orthogonal) computational basis for H4 with
|0〉 =
(
1
0
)
; |1〉 =
(
0
1
)
and preferences of the players defined as in expressions (11) - (14). Consider the two qubit
quantum computation
U =

U11 U12 U13 U14
U21 U22 U23 U24
U31 U32 U33 U34
U41 U42 U43 U44

as a two player, two strategy quantum game represented with respect to the basis B. Also,
let B′ = {|0〉 , |1〉} be the computational basis for each H2 that constitutes the players’ set
of strategies. A strategy for Player I is the choice of a qubit state, say
A = x1 |0〉+ y1 |1〉
and a strategy for Player II is the choice of qubit state, say
B = x2 |0〉 + y2 |1〉 .
Next, consider a Nash equilibrium play of the quantum game U , that is, a play in which
Player I chooses the strategy
A∗ =
(
x∗1
y∗1
)
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and Player II chooses the strategy
B∗ =
(
x∗2
y∗2
)
.
The output of the game at this Nash equilibrium is
N = U(A∗, B∗) =

U11x
∗
1x
∗
2 + U12x
∗
1y
∗
2 + U13y
∗
1x
∗
2 + U14y
∗
1y
∗
2
U21x
∗
1x
∗
2 + U22x
∗
1y
∗
2 + U23y
∗
1x
∗
2 + U24y
∗
1y
∗
2
U31x
∗
1x
∗
2 + U32x
∗
1y
∗
2 + U33y
∗
1x
∗
2 + U34y
∗
1y
∗
2
U41x
∗
1x
∗
2 + U42x
∗
1y
∗
2 + U43y
∗
1x
∗
2 + U44y
∗
1y
∗
2
 (17)
with ‖N‖2 = 1 and
θ(N,bi) = cos
−1(|Ui1x
∗
1x
∗
2 + Ui2x
∗
1y
∗
2 + Ui3y
∗
1x
∗
2 + Ui4y
∗
1y
∗
2|
2)
5.1 Nash equilibrium in quantum prisoner’s dilemma
A unilateral deviation on part of Player I from the play (A∗, B∗) to any other (A,B∗) will
produce the output state N̂ such that
θ(N̂,b3)
≥ θ(N,b3) and θ(N̂,b4) ≥ θ(N,b4)
Because the inverse cosine function is decreasing and the quadratic function is one-to-one
and increasing on non-negative inputs, it follows that
|U31x1x
∗
2 + U32x1y
∗
2 + U33y1x
∗
2 + U34y1y
∗
2| ≤ |U31x
∗
1x
∗
2 + U32x
∗
1y
∗
2 + U33y
∗
1x
∗
2 + U34y
∗
1y
∗
2| .
(18)
and that
|U41x1x
∗
2 + U42x1y
∗
2 + U43y1x
∗
2 + U44y1y
∗
2| ≤ |U41x
∗
1x
∗
2 + U42x
∗
1y
∗
2 + U43y
∗
1x
∗
2 + U44y
∗
1y
∗
2| .
(19)
Likewise, a unilateral deviation on part of Player II from the play (A∗, B∗) to any other
(A∗, B) will produce the output state N˜ such that
θ
(N˜,b2)
≥ θ(N,b2) and θ(N˜,b4) ≥ θ(N,b4).
Reasoning as in the case of Player I above, the previous two inequalities representing Player
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II’s preferences can be expanded as
|U21x
∗
1x2 + U22x
∗
1y2 + U23y
∗
1x2 + U24y
∗
1y2| ≤ |U21x
∗
1x
∗
2 + U22x
∗
1y
∗
2 + U23y
∗
1x
∗
2 + U24y
∗
1y
∗
2| .
(20)
and
|U41x
∗
1x2 + U42x
∗
1y2 + U43y
∗
1x2 + U44y
∗
1y2| ≤ |U41x
∗
1x
∗
2 + U42x
∗
1y
∗
2 + U43y
∗
1x
∗
2 + U44y
∗
1y
∗
2| .
(21)
Focusing back on Player I’s preferences and factoring and applying triangle inequality
on the right-hand side of inequality (18) produces
|U31x1x
∗
2 + U32x1y
∗
2 + U33y1x
∗
2 + U34y1y
∗
2| ≤ |U31x
∗
2 + U32y
∗
2|·|x
∗
1|+|U33x
∗
2 + U34y
∗
2 |·|y
∗
1 |
which can be expressed compactly as
|U31x1x
∗
2 + U32x1y
∗
2 + U33y1x
∗
2 + U34y1y
∗
2| ≤ P |x
∗
1|+Q |y
∗
1| (22)
with P = |U31x∗2 + U32y∗2| and Q = |U33x∗2 + U34y∗2 |. Applying the same reasoning to
inequality (19) gives
|U41x1x
∗
2 + U42x1y
∗
2 + U43y1x
∗
2 + U44y1y
∗
2| ≤ P
′ |x∗1|+Q
′ |y∗1 | (23)
with P ′ = |U41x∗2 + U42y∗2| and Q′ = |U43x∗2 + U44y∗2|. Inequalities (22) and (23) can
be further simplified by factoring and applying the triangle inequality to their respective
left-hand sides, giving two cases each:
P |x1|+Q|y1| ≤ P |x
∗
1|+Q|y
∗
1| (24)
or
P |x1|+Q|y1| ≥ P |x
∗
1|+Q|y
∗
1| (25)
and
P ′|x1|+Q
′|y1| ≤ P
′|x∗1|+Q
′|y∗1 | (26)
or
P ′|x1|+Q
′|y1| ≥ P
′|x∗1|+Q
′|y∗1|. (27)
Similar reasoning applied to inequalities (20) and (21) for Player II will produce the
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following collection of inequalities:
S|x2|+ T |y2| ≤ S|x
∗
2|+ T |y
∗
2| (28)
or
S|x2|+ T |y2| ≥ S|x
∗
2|+ T |y
∗
2| (29)
and
S′|x2|+ T
′|y2| ≤ S
′|x∗2|+ T
′|y∗2 | (30)
or
S′|x2|+ T
′|y2| ≥ S
′|x∗2|+ T
′|y∗2|. (31)
with S = |U21x∗1 + U23y∗1|, T = |U22x∗1 + U24y∗1|, S′ = |U42x∗1 + U44y∗1|, and T ′ =
|U42x
∗
1 + U44y
∗
1 |.
Inequalities (24) - (31) capture the structure of Nash equilibrium in the class of two
qubit quantum computations, U , using the notion of dominant strategies from Prisoner’s
Dilemma. In particular, Each player’s dominant, and therefore Nash equilibrium, strategic
choice can be analyzed in comparison to all other strategic choices of the player and with
respect to the parameters of the particular game U . That is, one can solve inequalities (24)
- (31) for the Nash equilibrium parameters |x∗i | and |y∗i | in terms of the paramters |xi| and
|yi| and the parameters of the game U
6 Conclusions
Although I gamed two qubit quantum computations here via Prisoner’s Dilemma, the same
could be done using other non-cooperative two player games such Stag Hunt, Chicken,
Battle of the Sexes, and the full general class of the so-called Hawk-Dove games to which
the latter two (and Prisoner’s Dilemma) belong. Readers interested in the quantization of
these games are refered to [9, 10, 11], respectively.
Multi-qudit quantum computations could be gamed for constrained optimization using
non-cooperative multi-player games. More generally, it is possible to game the quantum to
construct more general notions of state distinguishability [12] as well as to construct notions
of quantum data classification [13].
11
7 Acknowledgment
I am grateful to Derek Abbott, Steven Bleiler, Azhar Iqbal, and Simon J.D. Phoenix for
fruitful discussions. I am also indebted to the referees whose advice has elevated the quality
of this paper’s presentation and results.
References
[1] D. A. Meyer, Quantum Strategies, Physical Review Letters, Volume 82, pages 1052-
1055, 1999. 1
[2] J. Eisert and M. Wilkens and M. Lewenstein, Quantum Games and Quantum Strate-
gies, Physical Review Letters, Volume 83, pages 3077-3080, 1999. 1
[3] F. S. Khan, S. J. D. Phoenix, Gaming the Quantum, Quantum Information and Com-
putation, Volume 13, Number 3&4, 2013. 1, 3, 6
[4] J. Baez, Quantum quandaries: A Category Theoretic Perspective, The Structural
Foundations of Quantum Gravity, 240-265. 2, 3
[5] S. A. Bleiler, A Formalism for Quantum Games and an Application, Portland State
University, preprint at http://arxiv.org/abs/0808.1389, 2008. 2
[6] S. Abramsky, B. Coecke, Categorical Quantum Mechanics, Handbook of Quantum
Logic and Quantum Structures volume II, Elsevier, 2008. 3
[7] V. Bergholm, J. B. Biamonte, Categorical Quantum Circuits, Journal of Physics A:
Mathematical and Theoretical, RR1017, 2011. 3
[8] F. S. Khan, S. J. D. Phoenix, Minimaximizing Two Qubit Quantum Computations,
Quantum Information Processing, Volume 12, Number 12, 2013. 7, 8
[9] A. Iqbal, T. Cheon, Constructing quantum games from nonfactorizable joint probabil-
ities, Physical Review E, 76, 061122, 2007. 11
[10] A. Nawaz, A. H. Toor, Dilemma and quantum battle of sexes, Journal of Physics A:
Mathematical and Genera,l Volume 37, Number 15, 2004. 11
[11] A. Nawaz, A. H. Toor, Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Quantum Hawk-Dove
Game, Chinese Physics Letters Volume 27 Number 5, 2010. 11
[12] F. S. Khan, S. J. D. Phoenix, Khalifa Unviersity Working Paper. 11
[13] F. S. Khan, S. J. D. Phoenix, A. El Hady, Khalifa Unviersity Working Paper. 11
12
